Evidence gaps
yield mechanics — searched, not found: Checked help.hastra.io PRIME/wYLDS pages, figuremarkets.com Democratized Prime terms, solana.com overview — how yield accrues or distributes to PRIME holders is not published.
holding <name> — searched, not found: ylds.com states reserve composition is 'available on demand' only; no instrument-level holdings published for YLDS reserves or the HELOC pool.
issuer entity — searched, not found: Checked iq.wiki, Hastra docs, and press releases — Hastra names no legal entity; it presents as an anonymous project incubated by Figure Technologies and Provenance Blockchain Foundation.
legal vehicle — searched, not found: Checked hastra.io/terms, help.hastra.io, and SEC EDGAR — no trust, SPV, or corporate vehicle for PRIME/wYLDS is named; only YLDS's issuer Figure Certificate Company is registered.
bankruptcy remote — searched, not found: Checked hastra.io/terms and ylds.com — no bankruptcy-remoteness structure for the Hastra wrapper is documented; YLDS is an unsecured obligation of Figure Certificate Company.
tax treatment — searched, not found: Checked hastra.io/terms, help.hastra.io, ylds.com — no tax guidance published for PRIME or wYLDS holders.
attestations — searched, not found: Checked ylds.com and ylds.com/institutions — reserve coverage percentage is published but no named attestation provider or report was found.
attestation frequency — searched, not found: Checked ylds.com and help.hastra.io — no attestation cadence published.
audits <name> — searched, not found: Checked github.com/provenance-io/hastra-sol-vault and help.hastra.io — no published third-party smart-contract audit found.
fee <name> — searched, not found: Checked help.hastra.io PRIME and wYLDS pages and the programmatic integration guide — no fee schedule published.
redemption minimum — searched, not found: No per-user minimum published; the integration guide states only an operator batching minimum of $2,000 for wYLDS to USDC redemption.
redemption cap — searched, not found: Checked help.hastra.io integration guide and hastra.io/terms — no redemption cap published; redemption is gated on redeem-vault liquidity.
risk credit — searched, not found: Not separately sourced beyond general YLDS debt-security risk disclosures on ylds.com.
risk custodian — searched, not found: Checked ylds.com/institutions and figuremarkets.com addendum — no custodian failure terms published.
risk hack — searched, not found: Checked github.com/provenance-io/hastra-sol-vault and web search — no audit, bug bounty, or incident history published.
risk regulatory — searched, not found: Checked SEC.gov and hastra.io/terms — no regulatory risk disclosure specific to the unregistered PRIME/wYLDS wrapper found.
risk redemption gate — searched, not found: Checked help.hastra.io integration guide — redemption depends on redeem-vault liquidity and operator batching, but no gate policy is published.
risk depeg — searched, not found: No depeg history or secondary-market risk disclosure found; tokens launched November 2025.
risk concentration — searched, not found: Checked figuremarkets.com Democratized Prime terms — no numeric concentration caps disclosed for the HELOC pool.
min investment — searched, not found: Checked help.hastra.io/prime — PRIME staking minimum not published ('Check Hastra's platform'); the underlying YLDS certificate minimum is $0.01.
Rejected facts
Operating historyHastra’s disclosed ecosystem bridges Figure’s YLDS into wYLDS and stakes wYLDS into PRIME. The evidence provides no dated founding milestone or historical scale.DisputedMore
Sources · 2
The candidate contains no actual operating-history facts — it merely restates the YLDS→wYLDS→PRIME token flow (ef506578) and calls it an 'ecosystem.' No milestones, years, or scale are asserted or available, so this reads as filler; it belongs in unknowns rather than as a positive candidate.
help.hastra.io ↗“YLDS ( Figure Markets )
↓ Bridge to other chains
wYLDS ( Hastra )
↓ Stake for PRIME
PRIME ( Hastra )”
solana.com ↗“Hastra is a Solana-based distribution layer for Figure’s credit infrastructure, built on Provenance Blockchain with yield-bearing tokens issued as SPL assets.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=2, disputed) | gpt-family: contradicted — The sources support the described token flow: YLDS is bridged into Hastra’s wYLDS, and wYLDS is staked 1:1 to obtain PRIME. They provide no dated founding milestone. However, the Solana source does pr | anthropic-family: contradicted — The token-flow portion of the claim is confirmed: the Hastra help page verbatim shows 'YLDS (Figure Markets) ↓ Bridge to other chains, wYLDS (Hastra) ↓ Stake for PRIME, PRIME (Hastra),' and the Solana | kimi-family: contradicted — The first part of the claim is supported: both cited sources confirm the YLDS -> wYLDS bridge and wYLDS -> PRIME staking flow. However, the claim's second assertion — that the evidence 'provides no da
Who can hold/mintAnyone can hold wYLDS and PRIME without KYC; direct YLDS mint and redemption require KYC and are open to eligible retail and institutions, including U.S. personsUnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
help.hastra.io ↗“Earns interest automatically just by holding wYLDS in your wallet - no staking or KYC required.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — The source supports that holding wYLDS and earning its yield require no KYC. It does not establish that anyone can hold PRIME without KYC, nor does it state the KYC requirements or investor eligibilit | anthropic-family: unsupported — The cited source supports only one narrow piece of the claim: that holding wYLDS requires no KYC ('Earns interest automatically just by holding wYLDS in your wallet - no staking or KYC required'). It | gpt-family: unsupported — The source states that earning interest by holding wYLDS requires no KYC, but it does not state that anyone is legally or operationally eligible to acquire or hold wYLDS. The claim broadens a no-KYC y
How it worksA user stakes wYLDS and receives PRIME at a 1:1 ratio. Unstaking burns PRIME and returns wYLDS atomically in a single call.UnverifiedMore
Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 by YLDS held in Hastra's reserve.
Sources · 2
solana.com ↗“PRIME is obtained by staking wYLDS at a 1:1 ratio”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | gpt-family: contradicted — The atomic unstaking mechanism is supported: the integration guide says redeem burns PRIME and transfers proportional wYLDS in one call. However, the claim that staking always issues PRIME at a 1:1 ra | anthropic-family: contradicted — Two of the three sub-claims are supported: the atomic burn-PRIME-receive-wYLDS single call is directly quoted in the Hastra SOL integration guide ('Atomically burn PRIME and receive wYLDS in a single
Source documentsFigure Technology Solutions Form 10-Q for Q1 2026 -- confirms Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra) as the Hastra protocol operator and references Hastra's holding of YLDS.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The refetched SEC content is predominantly XBRL metadata and does not contain the quoted text “Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra)” or any readable disclosure establishing that Signum is the Hastra protocol oper | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content from the cited SEC URL consists entirely of raw XBRL context/tag metadata (dei: and us-gaap: taxonomy elements, dates, member tags) from the document's header/instance data. It | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided text snippet from Figure Technology Solutions Form 10-Q for Q1 2026 does not contain the quoted text 'Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra)' nor any mention of Signum Ltd., Hastra protocol, or YLDS ho
Source documentsFCC Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-03-31 -- discloses YLDS reserve portfolio composition (UMB Bank repo, Treasury bills, Goldman Sachs money-market fund).UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The fetched SEC filing is Figure Certificate Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026. Its embedded filing data expressly identifies the relevant reserve instruments as “Goldm | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content only shows the XBRL context tags and the table of contents/cover page of the 10-Q; the actual Note 3 Fair Value of Financial Instruments table (pages 11-13) where the reserve po | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched source text for the FCC Form 10-Q does not contain the claimed quote 'Total ... $600,824' nor does it explicitly mention 'YLDS'. Although the XBRL metadata lists Goldman Sachs Financial
Source documentsHastra Terms of Use/Service -- governs PRIME/wYLDS eligibility, KYC, liability cap ($100), and disclaimers; last updated 2025-12-03.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“users must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”
hastra.io ↗“HASTRA'S TOTAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THESE TERMS … EXCEED ONE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($100).”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T10:46:11.442Z from rejected status | panel 0/4 confirmed (agreement=3) | gpt-family: unsupported — The archived Terms confirm the December 3, 2025 update date, govern Site/Protocol use and eligibility, expressly exclude U.S. residents/citizens/persons located in the U.S. or its territories, describ | anthropic-family: unsupported — The eligibility quote ('You must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory') and the last-updated date (December 3, 2025) are directly confirm | kimi-family: unsupported — The archived snapshot confirms the document is Hastra's Terms of Use, last updated December 3, 2025, governing wYLDS/PRIME eligibility (Section 1 matches the quoted US-person exclusion) and containing | gpt-family: unsupported — The source confirms that the document is Hastra’s Terms of Use, was last updated December 3, 2025, governs the Site and Protocol, addresses PRIME and wYLDS, and contains the quoted U.S.-eligibility ex
OnboardingComplete KYC identity verification and OFAC/OFSI sanctions/jurisdiction screening before accessing Hastra's site or protocol; the underlying YLDS security separately requires its own KYC onboarding to earn interest or redeem.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
ylds.com ↗“All holders must successfully onboard and complete KYC. Eligibility may vary by jurisdiction.”
hastra.io ↗“If Hastra determines that you are ineligible or have breached any of your representations or warranties under this section, we may block your access to the Site.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T07:14:28.194Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=3) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — Hastra’s Terms impose age, jurisdiction, legal-compliance, and sanctions-related representations for Site/Protocol use, and state that Hastra may require additional information or documentation to ver | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The YLDS portion is confirmed: ylds.com FAQ states 'All holders must successfully onboard and complete KYC' and that 'KYC'ed holders of YLDS can redeem for fiat,' supporting the claim that the underly | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The claim states that users must complete KYC identity verification before accessing Hastra's site or protocol. However, Hastra's Terms of Use describe the protocol as a set of 'permissionless smart-c
ConcentrationPRIME's yield and value are concentrated in a single external program -- Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC+ lending pool -- and a single underlying asset class of home-equity lines of credit, with no diversification across other loan types or originators. Figure's own HELOC credit-profile disclosure shows heavy concentration in second-lien loans (82.68% of the illustrative 2025 Q3 pool), which are subordinate to first mortgages and typically carry higher loss severity in a downturn.UnverifiedMore
The base collateral wrapper is also concentrated in a single stablecoin pairing, wYLDS/YLDS, so PRIME has no exposure diversification away from Figure/Hastra-related counterparties.
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“PRIME yield is generated through Demo Prime's HELOC lending operations, providing exposure to real estate-backed lending.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The Hastra page supports that PRIME staking uses wYLDS, that wYLDS is backed by YLDS reserves, and that PRIME yield comes from Figure/Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations. The cited Figure disc | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — Only hastra.io/prime was actually re-fetched and its content supports the general claims that PRIME's yield derives solely from Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending pool, that the base collateral | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — Hastra supports that PRIME has HELOC exposure and that its yield is generated through Figure’s Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations. However, it does not support the absolute characterization t
RegulatoryPRIME and wYLDS are unregistered token wrappers issued by an offshore BVI entity, and Hastra's Terms explicitly exclude U.S. persons and residents of OFAC/OFSI-sanctioned jurisdictions from participating.UnverifiedMore
The underlying YLDS security is SEC-registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a face-amount certificate, so any adverse SEC action, rule change, or loss of that registration at the FCC layer could disrupt or devalue the YLDS backing wYLDS/PRIME. Because PRIME's own legal status is not established by any registration statement or disclosed exemption, its treatment under U.S. or other securities laws remains uncertain.
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“users must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”
crowdfundinsider.com ↗“YLDS represents a blockchain-based face-amount certificate officially registered with the US SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T10:49:39.656Z from rejected status | panel 0/4 confirmed (agreement=3) | gpt-family: unsupported — The Hastra Terms support that Signum Ltd. is a BVI entity, that wYLDS is backed 1:1 by SEC-registered YLDS, that PRIME is obtained by staking wYLDS, and that U.S. persons and persons connected with co | anthropic-family: unsupported — Most of the claim is well-supported by the archived Hastra Terms: the BVI issuer (Signum Ltd., organized under BVI law, subsidiary of Provenance Cayman Foundation), the exclusion of U.S. persons/terri | kimi-family: unsupported — The Hastra Terms archived content supports: the BVI issuer (Signum Ltd., organized under BVI law, subsidiary of Provenance Cayman Foundation), the exclusion of U.S. persons and residents of OFAC/OFSI- | gpt-family: unsupported — The archived Hastra Terms support that Signum Ltd. is organized in the BVI, that Hastra provides the Protocol, that wYLDS is backed 1:1 by SEC-registered YLDS, that PRIME is a liquid staking token, an
Exit pathsKYC'd YLDS holders may redeem certificates directly with Figure Markets at face value plus accrued interest, settled as fast as same day via credit-line-backed liquidity; minimum is one certificate ($0.01), no surrender fee.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
ylds.com ↗“As fast as same day. Credit-line-backed liquidity … redeem via figuremarkets.com or the Figure Markets app.”
cube.exchange ↗“redemption at face value plus accrued and unpaid interest, subject to the issuer's and platform's operating rules … access is limited to approved accounts.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The YLDS homepage confirms that KYC-completed holders can redeem for fiat through Figure Markets’ website or app, and describes redemption as “as fast as same day” with “Credit-line-backed liquidity.” | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched ylds.com content confirms several elements: KYC'd holders can redeem directly via Figure Markets (FAQ: 'KYC'ed holders of YLDS can redeem for fiat through figuremarkets.com or the Figur | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The retrieved text supports that KYC'd holders can redeem YLDS via figuremarkets.com or the Figure Markets mobile app, settled as fast as same day via credit-line-backed liquidity, with a minimum of o
Fee schedule0UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
help.hastra.io ↗“The document contains no mention of deposit, redemption, or any other fees.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T07:11:35.279Z from rejected status | panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The archived Solana integration guide describes 1:1 USDC→wYLDS minting and formulas for PRIME redemption, but it never expressly states that mint, deposit, redemption, withdrawal, operator-mediated se | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — Only the Solana integration guide was actually retrieved; the docs.hastra.io/products/hastra-prime page (the source for the quote 'No deposit or withdrawal fees are charged by the protocol') was not f
Fee schedule0UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched page states that unstaked wYLDS yield is paid as additional wYLDS, but it does not disclose any fee, state that fees are zero, or otherwise substantiate `fee_wylds = 0`. | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The cited page explains how wYLDS yield accrues and is claimed monthly, and how PRIME differs, but it never mentions any fee (or absence of fee) associated with holding or claiming wYLDS. The quote 'Y | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided source text explains how wYLDS and PRIME accrue and payout yield, but it contains no mention of fees or a zero-fee structure for wYLDS. Per the verdict guidelines, assuming an undisclosed
AuditsInformal Systems conducted a Solana program security audit of Hastra's vault-mint and vault-stake programs, Sept 24–Nov 18, 2025, finding 1 Critical, 4 Medium, 2 Low and 2 Informational issues, all reported resolved before mainnet launch.DisputedMore
Sources · 1
Informal Systems audited Hastra's vault-mint/vault-stake Solana programs (Sept–Nov 2025); all findings resolved (breadth-opencode, breadth-codex, citing hastra.io PDF audit report).
No third-party smart-contract audit was found for PRIME/wYLDS (breadth-claude, depth-structure-flows).
hastra.io ↗“In September 2025, Figure engaged Informal Systems to conduct a comprehensive security audit … All findings were thoroughly resolved”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T00:03:28.931Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=2, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The report supports that Figure engaged Informal Systems for an audit of Hastra’s vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs, conducted in two phases from September 24 to November 18, 2025. It also ex | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The audit report confirms the dates, phases, program names, and the initial-phase severity breakdown (1 Critical, 4 Medium, 2 Low, 2 Informational) exactly as claimed. However, the claim conflates thi | google/gemini-3.6-flash: contradicted — While Informal Systems did audit Hastra's vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs between Sept 24 and Nov 18, 2025, and all findings were resolved prior to production deployment, the audit identifi
CustodiansHastra vault (self-custody smart contract, no named custodian for wYLDS/YLDS reserve); UMB Bank N.A. and Flagstar Bank N.A.DisputedMore
(FCC/YLDS reserve custody per SEC 10-Q); BitGo Bank & Trust N.A. and Copper (institutional YLDS custody); Figure Equity Solutions, Inc. (YLDS transfer agent)
Sources · 4
FCC/YLDS reserve assets are custodied by UMB Bank N.A. and Flagstar Bank N.A. per FCC's SEC Form 10-Q (breadth-codex).
U.S. Bank Trust Company National Association serves as trustee/custodian for FCC reserves (breadth-api-2, sourced from docs.hastra.io, unverified).
BitGo Bank & Trust N.A. and Copper provide institutional custody services for YLDS holders (breadth-claude, depth-issuer-legal, depth-structure-flows).
No custodian is named for Hastra's own YLDS reserve backing wYLDS/PRIME (depth-structure-flows).
help.hastra.io ↗“Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve … Hastra uses these funds to purchase YLDS from Figure Markets.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T10:53:43.925Z from rejected status | panel 0/4 confirmed (agreement=5, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — The archived Hastra source supports only that wYLDS is backed 1:1 by YLDS held in Hastra's reserve and that Hastra purchases YLDS from Figure Markets. It does not establish that the reserve is a self- | anthropic-family: unsupported — Only two of the four cited sources were actually fetched/archived: the SEC 10-Q (fcc-20260331.htm) and the Hastra help page. The union of these two must support each item. (1) Hastra self-custody rese | kimi-family: unsupported — Hastra self-custody reserve is supported by help.hastra.io (wYLDS backed 1:1 by YLDS held in Hastra's reserve, no third-party custodian named). UMB Bank N.A. and Flagstar Bank N.A. appear in the FCC 1 | gpt-family: unsupported — The Hastra source confirms that wYLDS is backed 1:1 by YLDS held in Hastra’s reserve and refers to an underlying YLDS vault, but it does not establish that the reserve is held in a self-custody smart
Transfer restrictionsPRIME is a freely transferable Solana token but subject to program-controlled freeze authority (up to 5 admins) and mandatory KYC for onboarding/minting; US persons and OFAC/OFSI-sanctioned persons and jurisdictions (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Crimea/Donetsk/Luhansk) are excluded.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 3
api.rugcheck.xyz ↗“Freeze Authority still enabled … Tokens can be frozen and prevented from trading.”
docs.hastra.io ↗“You are not a citizen, resident, or organized in... the United States of America... Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, or the Crimea, Donetsk, or Luhansk regions”
hastra.io ↗“All holders must successfully onboard and complete KYC, with eligibility varying by jurisdiction … not located in … any country or territory subject to OFAC or OFSI sanctions.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=5) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched Hastra Terms support that U.S. persons are ineligible and expressly list Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and the Crimea/Donetsk/Luhansk regions among prohibited locations. However, they do not es | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The only source actually re-fetched (hastra.io/terms) no longer contains the quoted KYC language at all — there is no mention of 'KYC' anywhere in the current Eligibility section, contradicting the cl | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided live content supports the exclusion of US persons and specific sanctioned jurisdictions (such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Crimea/Donetsk/Luhansk regions). However, the live source doe
HoldingsGoldman Sachs Financial Square Treasury money-market fund — 0.39% of FCC's reserve portfolio backing YLDS, as of 2026-03-31.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
sec.gov ↗“Goldman Sachs Financial Square ... 2,362”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched 10-Q supports that Figure Certificate Company reported an investment labeled “Goldman Sachs Financial Square” with a reported amount of 2,362 (apparently presented in thousands) at March 3 | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched page content is only the XBRL header/context definitions and the table of contents for the 10-Q; it does not include the actual Note 3 Fair Value table (page 11) where the Goldman Sachs Fi | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited filing text contains a reference to 'Goldman Sachs Financial Square' in its XBRL tags, but it does not contain the claimed value/percentage of 0.39% (or the quoted figure '2,362'), nor does
HoldingsU.S. Treasury bills (maturing Apr–May 2026) — 34.77% of FCC's reserve portfolio backing YLDS, as of 2026-03-31.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched filing identifies eight holdings labeled “United States Treasury Bill” as of March 31, 2026, which supports that FCC held Treasury bills at that date. However, the supplied source content | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched page content only shows the XBRL context/tag metadata (e.g., 'United States Treasury Bill 1' through 'United States Treasury Bill 8', 'UMB Bank N.A. | Repurchase Agreements', 'Goldman S | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided SEC Form 10-Q filing excerpt for Figure Certificate Company (FCC) does not contain details confirming that U.S. Treasury bills constituted 34.77% of FCC's reserve portfolio backing YLDS,
HoldingsUMB Bank N.A. overnight Treasury repo — 64.84% of FCC's ~$600.8M reserve portfolio backing YLDS, as of 2026-03-31.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched filing identifies “UMB Bank N.A. | Repurchase Agreements” at March 31, 2026 and the claimed quoted amount of 389,556 (presumably $389.556 million if the relevant table is in thousands). Ho | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched page content only shows the XBRL context/header block and the table of contents for the 10-Q; it does not include the actual Note 3 (Fair Value of Financial Instruments) table text wher | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided source snippet does not contain the claimed percentage (64.84%), total reserve portfolio amount (~$600.8M), token ticker (YLDS), or the value of 389,556 cited in the claimed quotes.
CompositionPRIME is backed 1:1 by wYLDS, which is backed 1:1 by YLDS held in Hastra's reserve. YLDS is an SEC-registered face-amount certificate of Figure Certificate Company (FCC), backed solely by FCC's own asset portfolio — short-duration U.S.DisputedMore
Treasury bills and Treasury repurchase agreements (formerly prime-money-market-fund-style securities). As of 2026-03-31, FCC's approximately $600.8 million portfolio was about 64.84% UMB Bank overnight Treasury repo, 34.77% Treasury bills, and 0.39% Goldman Sachs Financial Square Treasury money-market fund. PRIME's own yield, distinct from this reserve backing, is generated separately by deploying staked wYLDS into Figure's 'Democratized Prime' HELOC+ lending pool.
Sources · 8
breadth-api-2 (docs.hastra.io/architecture/underlying-assets): claims YLDS itself 'is backed by a portfolio of prime Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs)' — conflicting with the majority view that YLDS/FCC reserves are Treasury bills and repo, with HELOC exposure sitting only in the separate Democratized Prime yield pool.
sec.gov ↗“Goldman Sachs Financial Square ... 2,362”
ylds.com ↗“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
Holder's claimOn-chain redemption right to wYLDS from Hastra's vault only; not a fund share; whether this extends to an enforceable claim against YLDS reserves or Figure Certificate Company is disputed.DisputedMore
Sources · 2
breadth-claude / depth-issuer-legal: the claim ultimately traces down the stack to an unsecured claim against Figure Certificate Company (FCC), since YLDS is 'unsecured face-amount certificates … solely backed by the assets of FCC.'
breadth-codex: any enforceable off-chain claim against Signum, YLDS reserves, or HELOC collateral is UNKNOWN/unestablished by public PRIME materials — the only clear right is the on-chain vault redemption.
help.hastra.io ↗“PRIME is fully transferable. Yield continues to accrue to whichever address holds the tokens.”
ylds.com ↗“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T10:47:55.355Z from rejected status | panel 1/4 confirmed (agreement=5, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — The Hastra source says PRIME can be unstaked at any time and that interest is realized upon redemption/unstaking, but it does not specify a legally enforceable on-chain redemption right, identify Hast | anthropic-family: confirmed — Both cited quotes appear verbatim in the archived sources: the Hastra PRIME FAQ contains "PRIME is fully transferable. Yield continues to accrue to whichever address holds the tokens," and the YLDS di | kimi-family: unsupported — Neither cited source states the claimed structure. The Hastra PRIME page supports only generic unstaking/transferability ('Unstake anytime', 'PRIME is fully transferable') but never mentions a 'redemp | gpt-family: unsupported — The atomic holder_claim is blank, so there is no stated value to verify. The archived sources do support the two quoted statements, but those quotations cannot confirm an unspecified claim.
CategoryLiquid staking token (LST) / yield-bearing receipt token, backed by real-world HELOC private-credit assets via wrapped YLDS.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
coingecko.com ↗“The technical mechanism utilizes a liquid staking model where the value of PRIME relative to wYLDS increases as interest from the loans is paid.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=5) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The Hastra documentation supports that PRIME is a yield-bearing receipt token representing a staked wYLDS position, and that wYLDS is a wrapped, yield-bearing receipt token backed by YLDS reserves. Ho | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The two quotes themselves are accurately lifted from the sources: help.hastra.io does describe PRIME as a 'Yield-bearing receipt token' (and wYLDS as a 'Yield bearing receipt token backed by reserves | google/gemini-3.6-flash: contradicted — The source documentation explicitly states that YLDS is backed by prime money market fund securities, contradicting the claim that it is backed by real-world HELOC private-credit assets.
Source documentsFigure Technology Solutions, Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-03-31, identifying Signum Ltd.UnverifiedMore
(dba Hastra) and its relationship to Figure/YLDS.
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched SEC filing content is consistent with a Figure filing for the period ending 2026-03-31 (CIK 0002064124 and dates shown), but the supplied fetched text does not contain the claimed quotatio | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched content from the cited SEC URL consists solely of XBRL context/tag definitions (dates, entity IDs, member tags) and contains no narrative text at all. Nowhere in the retrieved content does | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched text from the cited SEC Form 10-Q filing (figr-20260331.htm) does not contain any reference to 'Signum Ltd.' or 'Hastra'.
Source documentsFigure Certificate Company (FCC) Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-03-31, disclosing the composition of YLDS's backing portfolio (UMB Bank Treasury repo, Treasury bills, Goldman Sachs money-market fund).UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The SEC filing identifies itself as Figure Certificate Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026. Its extracted filing content specifically identifies Goldman Sachs Financial S | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content only contains the XBRL context definitions and the cover page/table of contents of the FCC 10-Q; it does not include the actual Note 3 (Fair Value of Financial Instruments) tabl | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched document from the provided URL does not contain the quoted text 'Total ... $600,824' or any mention of the amount $600,824.
Source documentsSherlock collaborative security audit of the Hastra protocol (March–April 2026).UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“Hastra is a DeFi protocol built by Figure Technologies, a fintech company focused on blockchain-based financial products and is operated by the Provenance Blockchain Foundation.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The re-fetched URL returns raw PDF object/image data only; it does not expose readable report text, title, auditor attribution, protocol name, audit scope, or March–April 2026 dates. The supplied exce | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched content from the cited URL is raw, uninterpretable PDF binary/stream data (object definitions, FlateDecode compressed streams, image XObjects). No actual extractable text matching the clai | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched PDF stream from https://hastra.io/sherlock-hastra-audit.pdf contains only raw PDF structure and image data without extractable text supporting the claimed quote.
Exit riskHastra's Terms disclose that unstaking wYLDS from PRIME 'may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions.' Separately, the wYLDS→USDC redemption path can stall if the off-ramp vault lacks sufficient USDC, since completion requires an operator to bridge funds via Circle's CCTP before finalizing the redemption. A surge of redemption requests could therefore be gated by liquidity or operational bottlenecks, with no disclosed cap or notice-period mechanics.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“Unstaking wYLDS from PRIME may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The available Solana integration guide directly states that PRIME redemption is a “single-step direct redemption” with “no unbonding period or queuing,” and that the on-chain unbonding period is perma | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The hastra.io/terms page fetch returned no body text at all (title only, likely JS-rendered content not captured), so the claimed quote 'may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restriction
Hack / smart contractHastra's Solana vault-mint and vault-stake programs manage deposit, staking, and reward-distribution logic, so a vulnerability could allow unauthorized draining of vault assets. An independent Informal Systems security audit (September–November 2025) identified 9 findings, including 1 critical vulnerability enabling deposit redirection via an unvalidated vault token account, which the team reports were 'thoroughly resolved' before mainnet launch.UnverifiedMore
No public audit has been confirmed for later program versions or the pending Ethereum deployment.
Sources · 3
docs.hastra.io ↗“Smart contracts manage the deposit, staking, and reward distribution process.”
hastra.io ↗“Our initial assessment identified 9 findings across various severity levels: 1 Critical, 4 Medium, 2 Low, and 2 Informational.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T00:17:05.646Z from rejected status | panel 1/4 confirmed (agreement=3) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The archived audit report supports that Informal Systems audited the Solana vault-mint and vault-stake programs in two phases from September 24 to November 18, 2025; that the programs handle deposits, | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The audit report source confirms virtually every material element of the claim: the vault-mint and vault-stake programs on Solana manage deposit, staking, and reward-distribution logic (matches the do | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — While the provided Informal Systems audit report confirms the timeframe (September–November 2025), the initial 9 findings (including 1 critical vulnerability concerning unvalidated vault token account | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The audit supports the core technical-risk narrative: the two Solana programs handle deposits, staking, and rewards; the initial assessment found a critical missing vault-token-account ownership valid
Credit / counterpartyPRIME holders carry layered credit exposure: to individual HELOC borrowers whose home-equity loans generate PRIME's yield, to Figure Technologies as loan originator/servicer, and to Figure Certificate Company as the issuer whose assets back YLDS/wYLDS. Deterioration in any of these counterparties' credit quality could impair the value passed through to PRIME.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“PRIME yield flows from actual loan interest paid by real estate borrowers.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T07:06:31.933Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The sources support that PRIME’s yield is tied to interest paid by HELOC/real-estate borrowers and that the HELOCs are originated by Figure Technologies. However, they do not support that Figure Techn | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The only archived source actually provided is hastra.io/prime-roots, which supports the claim that PRIME yield derives from real HELOC borrower interest and that the underlying HELOC loans are 'origin | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The archived Hastra page supports that PRIME’s yield is tied to interest paid by real-estate/HELOC borrowers and that the HELOCs were originated by Figure Technologies. It also states that PRIME yield
Minimum2000DisputedMore
Sources · 1
depth-structure-flows: wYLDS→USDC batching minimum is approximately $2,000; direct YLDS redemption minimum is 1 certificate ($0.01).
breadth-api-2: docs.hastra.io implies no protocol-enforced minimum ('0 USD') for staking/unstaking PRIME.
breadth-api-1: no redemption minimum disclosed; the $250 figure on hastra.io/prime-roots pertains to a rewards program, not redemption.
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched guide describes the PRIME→wYLDS redemption and begins describing the wYLDS→USDC process, but the provided live content does not state any redemption minimum, including $2,000. The claimed | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The claimed quote '$2k' does not appear anywhere in the live re-fetched content from the cited URL. The fetched page content covers the mint, stake, and redemption lifecycle explanations but cuts off | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited document does not mention a minimum redemption amount of 2000 or $2k anywhere in the text.
Fee schedule0UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched page states that unstaked wYLDS yield is paid as additional wYLDS and that PRIME redemption yields additional wYLDS. It does not state that there is no fee, no passthrough fee, no claim fe | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The cited quote merely describes the mechanism by which wYLDS yield is distributed ('paid out as additional wYLDS'); it says nothing about whether any fee is deducted from that pass-through yield. The | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited source explains how yield is accrued and claimed for wYLDS and PRIME, but it contains no mention of any passthrough fees or that fee_wylds_passthrough equals 0. Assuming an undisclosed fee i
AuditsCollaborative security audit of the Hastra protocol conducted by Sherlock, March–April 2026.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“Hastra is currently deployed on Solana mainnet and Ethereum testnet, with mainnet Ethereum deployment pending audit and security review.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The re-fetched PDF content is not text-extractable in the provided material and does not visibly identify Sherlock, Hastra, an audit engagement, or a March–April 2026 audit period. The quoted sentence | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content from the cited PDF URL is raw, undecoded PDF binary/stream data (compressed image and form XObject data) rather than extracted, human-readable text. None of the claimed quote te | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided source is a PDF file containing compressed binary streams and image objects without parseable text. Consequently, the re-fetched content does not verify the claimed quote or the assertion
AttestationsNo real-time proof-of-reserves; YLDS backing is disclosed via FCC's periodic SEC filings and an annual 'Big Four' financial-statement audit, with on-chain activity also visible via Provenance Blockchain explorer records. No attestation mechanism is disclosed for Hastra's own wYLDS reserve.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T07:21:12.276Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The YLDS page supports that reserves are reported quarterly in FCC’s public periodic SEC reports and advertises an annual Big Four audit. It also identifies Provenance as a public, permissionless bloc | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The ylds.com content confirms the core disclosure elements: quarterly SEC periodic reporting of reserves ("The reserves for YLDS are reported on a quarterly basis in the financial statements in our pu | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The YLDS homepage expressly states that YLDS reserves are reported quarterly in financial statements included in FCC’s public periodic SEC reports. It also states “Annual audit: Big Four Audited” / “A
Bankruptcy remotefalseDisputedMore
Sources · 2
false — YLDS is an unsecured obligation backed solely by FCC's general assets, with no bankruptcy-remote SPV; PRIME/wYLDS add further wrapper/counterparty risk on top (depth-issuer-legal, breadth-claude, breadth-opencode)
true — FCC is a SEC-registered face-amount certificate company and YLDS is held in protocol vault contracts separate from Signum Ltd.'s balance sheet (breadth-api-2)
ylds.com ↗“If there are losses on FCC's assets, FCC may not have sufficient resources to meet its obligations, including making interest and/or principal payments on your certificates.”
ylds.com ↗“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T10:55:37.533Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=3, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — The sources establish that YLDS are unsecured obligations backed solely by FCC's assets and subject to FCC's ability to pay. That demonstrates issuer credit and asset-loss risk, but it does not expres | anthropic-family: unsupported — Both claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived sources: the /legal disclosure contains "If there are losses on FCC's assets, FCC may not have sufficient resources to meet its obligations, includi | kimi-family: confirmed — The archived disclosures explicitly frame YLDS as unsecured debt obligations of FCC 'solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company' and state that if FCC's assets suffer losses 'FCC may no
Incidents & track recordNo depeg, exploit, operational halt, lawsuit, or regulatory enforcement action against Hastra, PRIME, wYLDS, or YLDS was found in any reviewed source. A pre-mainnet security audit by Informal Systems (Sept-Nov 2025) found nine issues, including one critical vulnerability (a deposit-redirection flaw), all reported resolved before launch.UnverifiedMore
Separately, Figure's founder Mike Cagney left SoFi as CEO in September 2017 amid workplace-conduct allegations, unrelated to Hastra/PRIME operations.
Sources · 2
en.wikipedia.org ↗“In September 2017, Cagney left SoFi after several workplace controversies, including allegations of misconduct and presiding over a toxic work environment.”
hastra.io ↗“Our initial assessment identified 9 findings across various severity levels: 1 Critical, 4 Medium, 2 Low, and 2 Informational. … All findings were thoroughly resolved”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T00:05:51.756Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=4) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The audit report supports that the initial assessment identified nine findings (1 critical, 4 medium, 2 low, 2 informational), that the critical issue enabled deposit redirection, and that the report | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The audit-related portion of the issuer_incidents claim is well supported by the archived Hastra/Informal Systems audit report: it explicitly lists 9 findings (1 Critical, 4 Medium, 2 Low, 2 Informati | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — While the details regarding Informal Systems' pre-mainnet security audit of the Hastra Solana programs (including the 9 findings, critical deposit-redirection flaw, dates, and resolution status) are f
What the issuer doesHastra is a DeFi protocol built by Figure Technology Solutions and incubated with the Provenance Blockchain Foundation, operated by Signum Ltd. It wraps Figure Certificate Company's SEC-registered yield stablecoin (YLDS) into on-chain tokens (wYLDS) and stakes them into yield products — PRIME (Figure Democratized Prime HELOC+ lending pools) and AUTO (auto-loan pools) — on Solana and Ethereum.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“Hastra is a DeFi protocol built by Figure Technologies, a fintech company focused on blockchain-based financial products and is operated by the Provenance Blockchain Foundation.”
globenewswire.com ↗“leading blockchain-native capital marketplace for the origination, funding, sale, and trading of on-chain loan products and tokenized real-world assets”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=6) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The cited audit quote directly identifies the Provenance Blockchain Foundation—not Signum Ltd.—as Hastra’s operator. That conflicts with the material assertion that Hastra is “operated by Signum Ltd.” | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The core factual claim about operational structure is internally inconsistent with the source material presented. The issuer claim states Hastra is 'incubated with the Provenance Blockchain Foundation | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched source content for hastra.io/sherlock-hastra-audit.pdf consists only of unparsed binary PDF streams and objects, containing no readable text to support the claim. No live text content w
Collateralization100DisputedMore
Sources · 2
breadth-api-1 and breadth-codex: no single PRIME-level collateralization ratio is disclosed; only sub-layer ratios are published (wYLDS:YLDS 1:1, HELOC+ standard/maximum LTV of 95%/98%, FCC qualified assets ~100.3% of certificate reserve as of 2026-03-31), so the figure should be treated as UNKNOWN rather than a single confirmed PRIME ratio.
ylds.com ↗“Percentage of required reserve covered: 100%; Excess / (deficit) reserve: 0.5%.”
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=4, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — Hastra’s live wYLDS documentation explicitly states: “Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra’s reserve,” and describes the reserve as backing issued wYLDS tokens “1:1.” This directly suppor | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The claim asserts a 100% collateralization ratio for the underlying, supported by two quotes. The first (Hastra help page) does confirm wYLDS is 'backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve' — but t | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The claimed quote from ylds.com ('Percentage of required reserve covered: 100%; Excess / (deficit) reserve: 0.5%.') is completely absent from the cited source. While Hastra states that wYLDS is backed
What it isPRIME is a liquid-staking receipt token minted 1:1 when a holder stakes wYLDS — Hastra's wrapped version of YLDS, the SEC-registered yield-bearing certificate issued by Figure Certificate Company — on the Hastra protocol operated by Signum Ltd. (BVI).UnverifiedMore
PRIME's value accrues from interest earned in Figure's 'Democratized Prime' HELOC home-equity lending pools, not from a direct claim on any Treasury reserve or fund share. A holder's enforceable right is an on-chain redemption of PRIME for wYLDS from the smart-contract vault rather than a direct claim against Figure, HELOC borrowers, or Figure Certificate Company.
Sources · 2
ylds.com ↗“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
help.hastra.io ↗“Stake wYLDS on Hastra to receive PRIME, your liquid staking token for HELOC lending pools … Yield comes from real HELOC lending operations”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T10:46:57.368Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=5) | gpt-family: contradicted — The sources support that users deposit wYLDS to receive transferable PRIME and that PRIME yield involves Democratized Prime HELOC lending. However, the narrative incorrectly attributes all value accru | anthropic-family: unsupported — Most of the claim is supported by the union of sources: YLDS being an SEC-registered face-amount certificate issued by Figure Certificate Company (ylds.com), wYLDS as a third-party wrapped version of | kimi-family: unsupported — Core mechanics are supported: ylds.com confirms YLDS is an SEC-registered face-amount certificate issued by Figure Certificate Company, backed solely by FCC assets (not a Treasury/fund claim); help.ha
Source documentsHastra publishes a public help/documentation center (help.hastra.io) containing explanatory articles on PRIME and wYLDS ("What is PRIME (Staked wYLDS)?", "How Is the PRIME Rate Determined?"), integration guides for Solana and Ethereum, and a dedicated risk-disclosure article ("Risks Article"), serving as the issuer's primary user-facing documentation set rather than a formal legal prospectus.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
help.hastra.io ↗“Understanding wYLDS and PRIME: Hastra's Ecosystem ... What is PRIME (Staked wYLDS)? ... How Is the PRIME Rate Determined? ... Hastra ETH Programmatic Integration Guide ... Hastra SOL Programmatic Integration Guide ... Understanding DeFi Lending ... Risks Article”
Verifier note: unsupported — The fetched help.hastra.io page confirms that Hastra operates a public help center and lists the specified PRIME, integration, and risk articles. However, it does not establish that this is the issuer’s “primary” user-facing documentation set, nor does it state that the materials are provided “rather than a formal legal prospectus.” Those comparative/characterization elements are unsupported by the supplied content. | quote: "❔ What is PRIME (Staked wYLDS)? ... 🔣 How Is the PRIME Rate Determined? ... 🛠️ Integration Guides ... 📘 Hastra ETH Programmatic Integration Guide ... 📗 Hastra SOL Programmatic Integration Guide ... 📚 DeFi Guides ... 📃 Risks Article"
Source documentsThe Figure Certificates (YLDS/wYLDS) underlying PRIME's Democratized Prime structure are offered under a formal SEC prospectus ("Figure Certificate Company Prospectus," dated February 20, 2025, SEC EDGAR filing), which discloses that the Certificates are unsecured, solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company, are not bank deposits or FDIC-insured, and will not be listed on any national securities exchange (though Figure Transferable Certificates may trade on a registered ATS or peer-to-peer on the Provenance Blockchain).UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
sec.gov ↗“Figure Certificate Company Prospectus Dated February 20, 2025... Figure Certificates (as defined below) are unsecured and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company.”
Verifier note: unsupported — The cited SEC prospectus directly supports the prospectus date, the Certificates’ unsecured status and sole backing by FCC assets, the non-bank/non-deposit/non-FDIC-insured disclosures, and the exchange/ATS/peer-to-peer trading statements. However, the provided source does not establish the claim’s linkage that these Certificates are specifically the YLDS/wYLDS instruments “underlying PRIME’s Democratized Prime structure.” The source refers to Figure Transferable and Figure Installment Certificates, but does not mention PRIME, Democratized Prime, YLDS, or wYLDS. Thus the compound claim as stated is not fully supported by the provided content. | quote: "“Figure Certificates (as defined below) are unsecured and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company.”"
Exit pathsAlternative exit path: instead of using Hastra's native unstake function, PRIME holders can sell PRIME directly on secondary-market DEX liquidity pools — Raydium and Orca on Solana, and Uniswap V3 on Ethereum (PRIME/USDC pair) — for instant settlement at the prevailing pool price rather than the protocol's NAV-based redemption rate. This path has no protocol-imposed minimum or cap, but pricing is subject to pool liquidity/slippage and DEX trading fees (not disclosed by Hastra) rather than Hastra's stated 0% redemption fee.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“Use or redeem for USDC
Easily redeem your wYLDS through Hastra, or swap for USDC in Raydium or Uniswap”
holder.io ↗“Hastra PRIME (PRIME) trades on Uniswap V3, Orca, and Raydium (CLMM).”
Verifier note: unsupported — The live Hastra page supports only that wYLDS—not PRIME—may be redeemed through Hastra or swapped for USDC on Raydium or Uniswap. It does not establish PRIME liquidity, Orca, Uniswap V3 or a PRIME/USDC Ethereum pair, nor the asserted instant settlement, prevailing-pool-price mechanics, absence of protocol minimums/caps, slippage/liquidity exposure, or fee comparison. No live content from the holder.io citation is provided. | quote: "Easily redeem your wYLDS through Hastra, or swap for USDC in Raydium or Uniswap"
VehicleThe wYLDS/YLDS leg underlying PRIME's Democratized Prime structure is issued as "Figure Certificates" by Figure Certificate Company (FCC), a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of Figure Markets Holding Inc. (FMHI), which is itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nasdaq-listed Figure Technology Solutions, Inc.UnverifiedMore
(FTS) following an August 2025 corporate recombination and FTS's IPO on September 12, 2025.
Sources · 1
sec.gov ↗“FMHI indirectly, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, owns all of the equity of FCC... In August 2025, FTS and FMHI recombined their businesses... FMHI became a wholly-owned subsidiary of FTS. Subsequently, on September 12, 2025, FTS completed its initial public offering.”
Verifier note: unsupported — The filing supports FCC’s ownership chain and the August 2025 recombination / September 12, 2025 IPO chronology. However, it does not mention wYLDS, YLDS, PRIME, or a “Democratized Prime” structure, nor does it establish that any wYLDS/YLDS leg is issued as Figure Certificates. Therefore the full claim is not established by the provided source. | quote: "“FMHI indirectly, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, owns all of the equity of FCC, comprised of 1,000 shares of common stock. In August 2025, FTS and FMHI recombined their businesses through a series of transactions. As a result of this recombination, FMHI became a wholly-owned subsidiary of FTS."
Exit pathsStandard redemption path: holders unstake PRIME at any time, with the vault burning PRIME and returning wYLDS 1:1; redemption is listed as instant, with 0% redemption fee and no stated minimum redemption amount or cap; yield accrued continuously is realized upon unstaking.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
tokenterminal.com ↗“PRIME can be unstaked back to wYLDS at any time with no permanent lock-up, the vault burning PRIME and returning wYLDS. No minimum redemption amounts apply.”
app.rwa.xyz ↗“Subscription Time
Instant
Min. Investment
—
Subscription Fees
0 %
Subscription Description
—
Redemption Time
Instant
Minimum Redemption Amount
—
Redemption Fees
0 % ”
Verifier note: unsupported — The re-fetched RWA.xyz page supports only that redemption time is listed as “Instant,” the minimum redemption amount is shown as “—,” and redemption fees are 0%. It does not establish that holders unstake PRIME at any time, that a vault burns PRIME and returns wYLDS 1:1, that there is no redemption cap, or that continuously accrued yield is realized upon unstaking. The alleged Token Terminal excerpt was not included in the live re-fetched content, so those additional mechanics cannot be verified from the provided material. | quote: "Redemption Time
Instant
Minimum Redemption Amount
—
Redemption Fees
0 %"
Exit pathsBeneath the instant PRIME-to-wYLDS redemption, Hastra's Proof of Reserves page shows a live "wYLDS pending redemption" balance (339,294.36 wYLDS observed July 2026) on the Provenance leg, indicating that final settlement of wYLDS into USDC/underlying cash can involve a queued/pending step rather than being instantaneous at every layer.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: unsupported — The live Proof of Reserves page does show a Provenance-line item labeled “wYLDS pending redemption” with a balance of 339,294.36. This supports the narrow observation that a pending-redemption balance existed. However, the source does not state that PRIME-to-wYLDS redemption is instant, does not identify the pending amount as final settlement into USDC or underlying cash, and does not explain that this balance represents a queue or establish a non-instantaneous settlement process “at every layer.” The stated July 2026 observation date is also not evidenced by the page content provided. | quote: "**wYLDS pending redemption:**
339,294.36"
Fee scheduleRedemption fee for PRIME is 0%, charged by neither issuer nor protocol; redemption time is listed as instant.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
app.rwa.xyz ↗“Redemption Time
Instant
Minimum Redemption Amount
—
Redemption Fees
0 %”
Verifier note: unsupported — The source explicitly lists PRIME's Redemption Time as “Instant” and Redemption Fees as “0 %,” supporting those portions. However, it does not establish that the fee is charged by neither the issuer nor the protocol. Moreover, it discloses a separate “Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield,” so the broad characterization of no issuer/protocol charge is not supported by the cited content. | quote: "Redemption Time
Instant
Minimum Redemption Amount
—
Redemption Fees
0 %"
Fee scheduleSubscription (mint) fee for acquiring PRIME is 0%, charged by neither issuer nor protocol; subscription time is listed as instant.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
app.rwa.xyz ↗“Subscription Time
Instant
Min. Investment
—
Subscription Fees
0 %”
Verifier note: unsupported — The fetched RWA.xyz page explicitly supports that PRIME has a 0% subscription fee and an instant subscription time. However, it does not establish the stronger attribution that the fee is charged by “neither issuer nor protocol.” Moreover, the page lists a separate “Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield,” so the broad no-fee attribution is not supported by the cited content. | quote: "Subscription Time
Instant
Min. Investment
—
Subscription Fees
0 %"
Fee scheduleHastra charges a platform fee of 50 basis points (0.50% annualized), deducted directly from the yield distributed to PRIME holders before it reaches them (i.e., taken from the spread between the Democratized Prime pool clearing rate/wYLDS interest and the rate paid to holders).UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
app.rwa.xyz ↗“Other Fees
Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield.”
Verifier note: unsupported — The live RWA.xyz page expressly supports that Hastra charges a 50 bps platform fee and that it is deducted from yield. However, it does not establish that 50 bps means “0.50% annualized,” nor does it specify the claimed mechanics that the fee is taken before distribution to PRIME holders from the spread between the Democratized Prime pool clearing rate/wYLDS interest and the holder rate. Those additional details make the full claim more specific than the cited source supports. | quote: "Other Fees
Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield."
Run operations
research · claude · ok · 481s · 35 links
research · openrouter:anthropic/claude-sonnet-5 · failed · 0s · 0 links
Coverage
30 of 35 fields verified · 3 unverified · 20 not found
Run 2026-08-03T11:04:37.739Z · degraded · cost $0.00
Automated research, human-reviewed. Verify against source documents before credit decisions.
